New bounds on the semantic secrecy capacity of the binary adversarial wiretap channel are established. Against an adversary which reads a ρr fraction of the transmitted codeword and modifies a ρw fraction of the codeword, we show an achievable rate of 1 − h(ρw) − ρr, where h(·) is the binary entropy function. We also give an upper bound which is nearly matching when ρr is small.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the most basic model of communication, a sender attempts to communicate with a receiver over a noisy channel, with the goal of achieving reliability: the receiver should be able to recover the intended message even in the presence of noise. The wiretap channel, introduced in [1], [2] , adds a wiretapper or eavesdropper to the model. The wiretapper also has access to a noisy version of the sender's transmission, and now the sender also wants to achieve secrecy: the wiretapper should not learn anything about the intended message. (These notions will be made precise later.) Typically, the sender is connected to both the receiver and wiretapper by a memoryless broadcast channel, and the dual goals of reliability and secrecy can be met with positive communication rate when the channel to the wiretapper is "noisier" than that to the receiver.
In this work, we consider the extension of the wiretap model to the adversarial setting. We not only allow the wiretapper to choose an arbitrary ρ r fraction of transmitted symbols to read (this is the "Wiretap Channel II" model of Ozarow and Wyner ([3] )), but also allow the wiretapper to choose an arbitrary ρ w fraction of errors to add to the transmission before it reaches the receiver. We refer to this model as the (ρ r , ρ w ) adversarial wiretap channel. An incomplete survey of related models and results appears in Section II-B; this particular model and the name "adversarial wiretap channel" were introduced in [4] along with an explicit construction for large alphabets. The authors of [4] also show that the capacity of such a channel is at most 1 − ρ w − ρ r .
The model of the adversarial wiretap channel represents a natural middle ground between truly adversarial errors (i.e. ρ r = 1, when the adversary has full knowledge of what is being transmitted) and fully oblivious errors (i.e. ρ r = 0, defined in [5] ), where the adversary has no knowledge of which codeword is being transmitted, but can add arbitrary errors to the codeword. In that respect it is related to the This work was supported by a Ministry of Education Tier 2 Grant (R-263-000-B61-112). more abstract model of γ-oblivious channels due to [5] , where, loosely, the parameter γ controls how much the channel knows about the transmitted codeword (see also the discussion in Section II-B).
The main theorem of this work is the following, which bounds the rate of a binary code which simultaneously achieves reliability and secrecy in the adversarial wiretap model.
Loosely, the loss of ρ r in the achievable rate is required to achieve secrecy, and can be matched in constructions by adding some pseudorandom noise to the transmitted symbols. The loss of h(ρ w ) in the rate then corresponds to what is necessary to correct a ρ w fraction of errors. The challenge faced by previous work such as [6] is that the best known rate for correcting an arbitrary ρ w error fraction is 1 − h(2ρ w ) for binary codes. However, there are a few cases when we can achieve a rate of 1 − h(ρ w ) against a ρ w fraction of errors, most notably in the case of random errors ( [7] ), and for oblivious errors ( [5] ).
The main point of our achievability analysis, which uses random coding, is that the adversary's errors must behave like random or oblivious errors, even with the auxiliary knowledge of a ρ r fraction of the codeword. This allows us to show that correcting such errors only requires a h(ρ w ) loss in the achievable rate, allowing for a final rate of 1−h(ρ w )−ρ r . This recalls the work of [8] ("Sufficiently myopic adversaries are blind"), and indeed we build on their techniques to show that the adversary is still "blind" after reading his choice of symbols.
Our result improves on previous known bounds for binary codes, and comes close to matching the upper bound on achievable rate induced by the random wiretap channel (Theorem 3.1) when ρ r is small.
Organization: In Section II, we define some terminology relating to the adversarial wiretap model, including the capacity, and build on this to discuss related work. In Section III, we show an upper bound on the achievable rate of any family of codes for the adversarial wiretap channel. We also give a lower bound in Section IV using a random code construction, which achieves both reliability and secrecy. We conclude in Section V with some discussion of future work. II. PRELIMINARIES A. Setup and notation Notation 1: We will use the following conventions throughout.
Unless otherwise noted, all logs are to base 2.
[n] denotes the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. The function h(·) is the binary entropy function h(p) = −p log p − (1 − p) log(1 − p), defined for p ∈ [0, 1]. More generally, for a random variable X, we denote by H(X) the entropy of X.
A binary code C is a subset of {0, 1} n for some integer n, the block length. The rate of a code C is R(C) := log|C|/n. All references to codes "of rate R" implicitly mean codes of rate at least R; in particular, if R < 0, we will assume the code is empty.
In this work, all codes C come equipped with an arbitrary encoding function which is a bijection between [|C|] and C mapping a message m to its encoding x. C also admits a decoding function from {0, 1} n → [|C|], the "nearest neighbor decoder," which maps a string y to the message m whose encoding is closest to y in Hamming distance, with ties broken arbitrarily.
In defining channel capacities, we will think of codes as belonging to a family of codes (denoted C). A family of codes is a sequence (C n ⊆ {0, 1} n ) n→∞ of codes with growing block length n. We are interested in the behavior of the codes in the family as n → ∞. For example, the rate of a family C is R(C) := lim inf n→∞ R(C n ). The focus of this work is on determining the capacity of the binary adversarial wiretap channel. Although we believe that analogous results hold over larger alphabets, we have not checked this formally.
Definition 2.1: Let ρ r ∈ (0, 1) and let ρ w ∈ (0, 1/2). The (ρ r , ρ w ) adversarial wiretap channel (AWTC) allows the adversary to read an arbitrary ρ r fraction of the transmitted codeword and introduce a ρ w fraction of errors whose distribution depends only on the code and the symbols read by the adversary.
Remark 1: This is the model proposed by [4] , where it is also called an AWTC, and is the same as the "active eavesdropper" model of [6] when ρ r = ρ w . The adversary may use randomness both in choosing the locations to read and in introducing errors.
In this definition, we restrict ρ r , ρ w to be nonzero. As we will outline in Section II-B, the capacity has already been established when either parameter is zero.
We now define what it means for a code to achieve secrecy and reliability over the AWTC. We will require our codes to achieve both conditions. We will define both weak secrecy and the stronger notion of semantic secrecy.
For a code C ⊆ {0, 1} n , we denote by S the random variable corresponding to the source message (distributed according to some distribution P S ), and by X the random variable corresponding to C's (possibly randomized) encoding of the message. We writeŜ for the output of the decoder upon receiving the corrupted version of X.
For a subset S ⊆ [n] of size ρ r n corresponding to the coordinates chosen by the adversary, denote by V(S ) the view of the adversary after observing the coordinates in S . That is, if S = {i 1 , . . . , i ρrn } ⊆ [n], and x ∼ X is a codeword, then V(S ) ∈ {0, 1, ?} n is the string whose ith coordinate is ? if i / ∈ S , and x i if i ∈ S . We will also refer to S as the support of V(S ).
We now define semantic secrecy (security), via the equivalent notion of mutual-information security (see [9] ). This notion of secrecy arises from dropping the assumption that messages are chosen uniformly from the message space.
Definition 2.2 (Semantic secrecy): Let C be a family of codes (C n ⊆ {0, 1} n ) n→∞ . Define the semantic secrecy metric
where for two finite-support distributions P and Q, D(P Q) denotes the relative entropy
If Sem(C n ) = e −Ω(n) , then we say that C achieves semantic secrecy. Definition 2.3 (Reliability): Let C be a family of codes (C n ⊆ {0, 1} n ) n→∞ . Let δ n be the average error probability of C n ; that is,
where the probability is taken over the randomness of the encoder and the error distribution introduced by the adversary.
If δ n → 0 as n → ∞, then we say that C achieves (asymptotic) reliability.
Let C be a code family of rate at least R > 0 which achieves reliability. If C achieves semantic secrecy, we will say that R is achievable under semantic secrecy.
Definition 2.4: The semantic secrecy capacity is the supremum of achievable rates under semantic secrecy.
Our main result is the following. Theorem 2.5: Let C s (ρ r , ρ w ) be the semantic secrecy capacity of the (ρ r , ρ w ) AWTC. Then
In fact, the upper bound holds under weak secrecy.
As there is a positive gap between our upper and lower bounds, a plot is provided for comparison in Figure 1 . Although the bounds become far apart as ρ r approaches 1 − h(ρ w ), because our lower bound approaches 0 even as the capacity remains positive, when ρ r is small compared to ρ w , we see that the two quantities are very close. Note that the secrecy capacity is equal to zero when ρr > 1−4ρw(1−ρw) (see [10] ).
B. Previous work
The (non-adversarial) wiretap channel has been the subject of a long line of work. Here we will describe what is known about several variants which incorporate some sort of adversarial behavior.
The AWTC. The terminology "adversarial wiretap channel" for this model was introduced in [4] . Their work give an upper bound on the capacity of the AWTC, and give an explicit construction of codes which meet this capacity over sufficiently large alphabets.
The semantic secrecy capacity of the (ρ r , ρ w ) adversarial wiretap channel is at most 1 − ρ r − ρ w .
Moreover, when the alphabet size is |Σ| = exp(Ω(1/ 2 )), there is an explicit code of rate 1−ρ r −ρ w − which achieves semantic secrecy and reliability over the (ρ r , ρ w ) AWTC.
Wiretapping and Active Adversaries. The authors of [6] consider the wiretap channel II model in which the adversary may also modify the bits which have been read. They then show that a suitable random code can be used to achieve (weak) secrecy and reliability. In fact, their construction also works without the restriction that the adversary modifies the same bits which he reads, so we may conclude the following. As stated in the introduction, the difference between the 1 − h(2ρ w ) − ρ r and our achievable rate arises because the construction of [6] uses a binary code which corrects any ρ w fraction of errors, for which 1 − h(2ρ w ) represents the best known achievable rate. The crux of our work is to show that errors introduced by a "limited-view" adversary behave more like random errors, for which 1 − h(ρ w ) is the optimal rate.
The Wiretap Channel II. When the adversary may read any ρ r fraction of the transmitted codeword, but does not inject any errors (ρ w = 0), this model is known as the wiretap channel II, due to Ozarow and Wyner ([3] ). In this setting, we have the following result (a matching code construction is also presented).
Theorem 4 ( [3] ): For any code of rate R which achieves weak secrecy on the (ρ r , 0) adversarial wiretap channel, we have
where δ is the error of the decoder.
In particular, a code family of rate R which achieves weak secrecy and reliability has R ≤ 1 − ρ r .
A generalization of this model is the Wiretap Channel II with a noisy main channel, whose capacity is established in [11] , even under the semantic secrecy condition. The bound attained here is the same as that of the standard wiretap channel, stated in a modified form in Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 2.6 ([11]): The semantic secrecy capacity when the eavesdropper reads an arbitrary ρ r fraction of the transmitted codeword and the main channel is a BSC(ρ w ) is equal to max
where X and Y are the input and output, respectively, of the legitimate receiver, [x] + = max(x, 0), and the maximum is taken over all (V, X, Y ) such that V −X −Y forms a Markov chain and the conditional distribution of Y given X is given by the BSC(ρ w ).
Oblivious adversaries. On the other hand, if ρ r = 0, the channel is a special case of a model studied by Langberg in [5] . (Note that the secrecy condition is vacuous for ρ r = 0.) Theorem 5 (implicit in [5] ): For ρ w ∈ [0, 1/2) and > 0, with high probability, a random code of rate
Myopic Adversaries. The work of [8] is closest in spirit to the current work. In their model, rather than reading a ρ r fraction of codeword symbols, the adversary receives the output of a BSC on the transmitted codeword. This result is similar to what we want to prove, but the BSC gives less information to the adversary than a comparable erasure channel, and we are allowing the erasure channel to be adversarial.
III. CAPACITY UPPER BOUND
To upper-bound the capacity of the adversarial wiretap channel, we reduce to the case of the standard, random wiretap channel ( [1] ). This channel, which we will refer to as the (ρ r , ρ w ) random wiretap channel, consists of a BEC(1− ρ r ) to the eavesdropper, and a BSC(ρ w ) to the receiver. The secrecy capacity of this channel is defined analogously to the previous section, and the following expression for the capacity was derived in [10] . Weak secrecy is defined precisely in [10] , but for our purposes it is sufficient that weak secrecy is a strictly weaker condition than semantic secrecy.
Theorem 3.1 ([10]): When ρ r ≤ 1 − h(ρ w ), the weak secrecy capacity of the (ρ r , ρ w ) random wiretap channel is equal to
The reduction from the adversarial case to the random case is standard: the adversary can choose to read and write at random, subject only to the bound on the total number of errors. Thus any code for the (ρ r , ρ w ) adversarial wiretap channel must also be resilient to a ρ r fraction of random errors, and preserve secrecy when a random ρ w fraction of symbols is read. To the best of our knowledge, however, this reduction has not been given explicitly in the literature. A more precise statment, together with a proof, appears in the full version of this paper ( [12] ). 
IV. CAPACITY LOWER BOUND
We will show that the semantic secrecy capacity of the (ρ r , ρ w ) AWTC is at least 1 − h(ρ w ) − ρ r by giving a code construction which achieves this rate. Unsurprisingly, we will show that a random stochastic code works. (Recall that a stochastic code uses a probabilistic encoding function, allowing multiple codewords to correspond to the same message.) For > 0, let C ⊆ {0, 1} n be a random code of rate R := 1−h(ρ w )− constructed by selecting 2 Rn i.i.d. vectors uniformly from {0, 1} n . Abusing notation, we also refer to the encoding map C : {0, 1} Rn → {0, 1} n which maps a binary string of length Rn to its corresponding codeword.
Define R such that R n = Rn − , for some to be set later. In order to ensure secrecy for our construction, we define the following partition Π = {A i } i∈{0,1} R n of C, which splits C into sets of size 2 .
We may then consider C as a stochastic code Remark 2: For semantic secrecy, we will show that any /n > ρ r suffices, so that the final rate of C Π can be taken to be, for example, 1 − h(ρ w ) − ρ r − /2. This rate bound, combined with the results of Lemma 4.1 and Theorem 4.2, which prove secrecy and reliability for this code, show that the capacity of the (ρ r , ρ w ) AWTC is at least 1 − h(ρ w ) − ρ r , as desired.
In the following sections, we will show that C Π achieves both secrecy and reliability over the (ρ r , ρ w ) adversarial wiretap channel (precise statements below).
A. Secrecy
Semantic security for the Wiretap Channel II is shown [11] , which shows that the random code constructed in the previous section achieves semantic secrecy. Although their reliability proof is for a discrete memoryless main channel and does not apply to our setting with an adversarial main channel, the adversarial nature of the Wiretap Channel II means that the secrecy analysis applies to the AWTC. We outline the proof below; for more details, see the original derivation in [11] .
At the core of the analysis is a "stronger soft-covering lemma," which shows that the distribution of the output of the channel on a large random subset of codewords is unlikely to be far from the distribution of the output of the channel on a truly random codeword. In other words, if each message is associated to ≈ 2 (ρr+ )n codewords, then the adversary's view will be statistically close to uniform for every message, and secrecy is achieved.
The "stronger" part of the name refers to the fact that this concentration is shown to happen with double-exponentially small probability, allowing us to union-bound over all choices of the adversary's view.
This allows us to show semantic secrecy for our code C Π , outlined in the following lemma. Recall that R = 1 − h(ρ w ) − /n − is the final rate of C Π . Lemma 4.1: When /n > ρ, the code C Π which associates each message m ∈ {0, 1} R n to 2 random codewords in {0, 1} n achieves semantic secrecy over the (ρ r , ρ w ) adversarial wiretap channel.
B. Reliability
In this section, we show that a random code C of rate 1 − h(ρ w ) − can correct a ρ w fraction of errors with high probability (over the choice of the code and the uniform choice of the transmitted codeword) when the error distribution depends only on C and a ρ r fraction of the transmitted codeword. This result is similar in spirit to those of [5] and [8] , described in Section II-B.
More formally, we will show the following. We follow the proof outline of [8] in order to show that the random code C achieves reliability over the adversarial (ρ r , ρ w ) wiretap channel. The primary difference is in the definition of the set C| V , as our adversarial model is different.
In this section, we will not use the association of codewords to messages induced by the partitioning Π, and will only consider C as an (ordered) codebook of 2 Rn uniform, equally likely strings.
Once the adversary has read a ρ r n fraction of the transmitted codeword, he knows that this codeword lies in the subset of C which is consistent with the read symbols, but each element of that subset is equally likely from his perspective. We will show that this is sufficient to ensure that he cannot cause a decoding error with non-vanishing probability.
The main tool in our analysis is the following lemma, from [8] . At a high level, it states that a set of random vectors (in our case, codewords) cannot be too concentrated in a small volume B. Lemma 4.3: Let A ⊆ {0, 1} n be a set with 2 αn elements for some α > 0, ν, β > 0, and B ⊂ A with |B| ≤ 2 n(α−β−ν) . Let X 1 , . . . , X N be chosen uniformly at random from A with N = 2 nβ . Then for constant c > 0,
. This lemma, which follows from a Chernoff bound, implies a standard result on the list-decodability of random codes.
Corollary 4.4: Let C ⊆ {0, 1} n be a random code of rate 1 − h(ρ w ) − for > 0. With probability 1 − exp(−Ω(n 2 )) over the choice of C, every Hamming ball in {0, 1} n of radius ρ w n contains at most O(n 2 ) elements of C.
Proof: In Lemma 4.3, let B ⊆ {0, 1} n be a Hamming ball of radius ρ w n, which has size at most 2 nh(ρw) . A union bound over all 2 n such Hamming balls proves the statement.
As before, let us denote the adversary's view by (v 1 , . . . , v n ) ∈ {0, 1, ?} n .
Denote by C| V the set of codewords which are consistent with V (i.e., the codewords which have v i in the ith coordinate, whenever v i =?). Let E 0 be the event that C| V has size between 2 (1−h(ρw)−ρr−3 /2)n and 2 (1−h(ρw)−ρr− /2)n for all views V . Using a Chernoff bound and union-bounding over all V , we see that
Conditioned on E 0 , C| V has size at least 2 n/4 , by our assumption on ρ r . We partition C| V into sets S i of size 2 n/4 , with the exception of the last set, which may have size less than 2 n/4 . This is done using the ordering on C: the first set S 1 consists of the first 2 n/4 elements of C| V , and each subsequent block contains the next ≤ 2 n/4 elements of C| V .
Let E 1 be the event that the transmitted codeword does not lie in the last set of the partition. Over the uniform choice of the transmitted codeword, we have that
Following the approach of [8] , we will show that (conditioned on E 0 and E 1 ) for any fixed error vector e of weight ρ w n, for every i, the probability over x ∈ S i that x + e causes a decoding error is small. In other words, even if the adversary is only oblivious over the much smaller set S i ⊆ C| V , he still cannot reliably cause a decoding error. (We can think of the set S i which contains the true transmitted codeword as being side or oracle information given to the decoder.)
In the analysis which follows, we may think of the set S r as one of the sets S i which have size 2 n/4 . We will show that any such set S r causes few decoding errors. In other words, if x + e conflicts with x , then both x and x are valid outputs of the decoder, and we will consider this to be a decoding error. In what follows, we will show that for any fixed error vector e, there are "few" conflicts in a random code.
Lemma 4.6: Let S r ⊆ C| V be of size 2 n/4 , and let e ∈ {0, 1} n have weight at most ρ w n. Let N e denote the number of codewords x ∈ S r such that x + e conflicts with some codeword not in S r . Then, conditioned on E 0 , N e ≤ O(n 4 ) with probability 1 − exp(−Ω(n 2 )) over the choice of C.
Proof: We first show that S r has few conflicts with the codewords outside of C| V . Let A ⊆ {0, 1} n be the set of all strings with are not consistent with V . In Lemma 4.3, set B = x∈Sr B ρw (x + e), and let X 1 , . . . , X N be the codewords of C \ C| V . By construction of C, the X i are chosen uniformly from the space A, and we have N ≤ 2 nR .
We have |A| = 2 n − 2 (1−ρr)n , and |B| ≤ 2 h(ρw)n+ n/4 ≤ 2 (1−R− /2)n . Thus, by Lemma 4.3, with probability 1 − 2 −Ω(n 2 ) , there are at most O(n 2 ) codewords x ∈ C \ C| V such that x is at distance ≤ ρ w n from x + e, for some x ∈ S r .
By Corollary 4.4, with probability 1 − exp −Ω(n 2 ) , for each such x , the number of codewords in C in the Hamming ball of radius ρ w n around x − e is at most O(n 2 ). Now we show that S r has few conflicts with the codewords in C| V \ S r . Because we are conditioning on E 0 , we have that |C| V | ≤ 2 (1−h(ρw)−ρr− /2)n . Set B as before, and let A c ⊆ {0, 1} n be the set of strings which are consistent with V (the complement of the set A above). We have |A c | = 2 (1−ρr)n .
As the elements of C| V \ S r are uniformly distributed in the set A c , we may apply Lemma 4.3 once more. As |B ∩ A c | ≤ 2 h(ρw)n+ n/4 ≤ 2 (1−ρr)n−(1−h(ρw)−ρr− /2)n− n/4 , by Lemma 4.3 we conclude that with probability 1 − exp −Ω(n 2 ) , there are at most O(n 2 ) codewords x ∈ C| V \ S r such that x is at distance ρ w n from x + e, for some x ∈ S r . Again by Corollary 4.4, with probability 1 − exp −Ω(n 2 ) , for each such x , the number of codewords in C in the Hamming ball of radius ρ w n around x − e is at most O(n 2 ).
This shows that there are at most O(n 2 ) codewords x ∈ C \ S r such that x ∈ x∈Sr B ρw (x + e), and each such x is in at most O(n 2 ) balls B ρw (x + e). Thus conditioned on E 0 , N e ≤ O(n 4 ) with probability 1 − exp(−Ω(n 2 )), as desired.
It remains to show that when the transmitted codeword is chosen uniformly from S r , the adversary is unlikely to cause confusion with another codeword in S r . This can be shown directly using the techniques of [8] , or by appealing to the results of [5] . Below, we give the necessary lemma statements; proofs appear in the full version of this paper ( [12] ).
Lemma 4.7: Assume that E 0 holds. Let T ⊆ {0, 1} n have size 2 n/8 , and fix e ∈ {0, 1} n of weight at most ρ w n. Let S r ⊆ C| V have size 2 n/4 .
Then with probability 1 − exp(−Ω(n 2 )) over the choice of S r , the number M e of x ∈ T such that x + e conflicts with some codeword in S r is at most O(n 4 ).
Lemma 4.8: Fix e ∈ {0, 1} n of weight at most ρ w n, and let S r ⊆ C| V have size 2 n/4 . Then with probability 1 − exp(−Ω(n 2 )) over the choice of codewords in S r , there are at most O(n 4 ) · 2 n/8 codewords x ∈ S r such that x + e contains another codeword in S r .
For a fixed set S r ⊆ C| V of size 2 n/4 and a fixed error vector e ∈ {0, 1} n of weight ρ w n, let E 2 (S r , e) be the event that the number of codewords in S r which result in a decoding error for a fixed error vector e is at most
Combining Lemmas 4.6 and 4.8, we see that Pr[E 2 (S r , e)|E 0 ] ≥ 1 − exp(−Ω(n 2 )).
Recall that {S i } was a partition of C| V into sets of size 2 n/4 , with the possible exception of the last set. Conditioned on the event E 1 , the set S i which contains the transmitted codeword has size 2 n/4 . In particular, we can apply a union bound over the exponentially many partition sets S i of size 2 n/4 , at most 2 n error vectors e, and adversary views V to conclude that E 2 (S i , e) holds for all such S i , e with probability 1 − exp(−Ω(n 2 )) over the choice of the code C.
Thus, conditioned on E 0 , the decoding error of C is at most with probability 1 − exp −Ω(n 2 ) . As E 0 holds with probability 1−exp(−2 Ω(n) ), C achieves decoding error o(1) with high probability over the choice of C.
Combined with the results of Section IV-A, we have shown the following: Theorem 4.9: Let C ⊆ {0, 1} n be a random code of rate R = 1 − h(ρ w ) − , and let Π = {A i } be a partition of C into subsets of size = ρ r n − O(1).
Then, with high probability over the choices of C and Π, the stochastic code C Π which maps the ith message m i ∈ {0, 1} Rn− to a random element of A i has rate R(C Π ) ≥ 1 − h(ρ r ) − ρ r − and achieves reliability and secrecy over the (ρ r , ρ w ) adversarial wiretap channel.
V. CONCLUSION
We have shown that the secrecy capacity of the (ρ r , ρ w ) adversarial wiretap channel is at least 1 − h(ρ w ) − ρ r .
Below we outline what we believe to be the most interesting directions for future research.
Exact capacity.
The most natural open question remaining is to close the gap between Corollary 3.2 and Theorem 4.9. It seems plausible that the lower bound can be improved to match the upper bound, as in the case of the Wiretap Channel II with noisy (rather than adversarial) main channel. Doing so would require a refinement of the reliability analysis to handle different input distributions.
Explicit constructions. The question of efficiently constructing binary codes for wiretap channels is a challenging one, and here we would be interested in any improvement over the fully random construction, including constructions which use fewer random bits. There have been constructions given for certain special cases, including when ρ r = 0 ([13]) and when ρ w = 0 ( [14] ), but to the best of our knowledge, nothing is known for the general case.
Note that over large alphabets, both of these questions were addressed by the construction of [4] , which pairs folded Reed-Solomon codes, which are optimally list-decodable, with explicit "algebraic manipulation detection" codes. The latter ingredient is still valid over a binary alphabet, but we do not know explicit binary codes which can be list-decoded with optimal rate.
